The Italian pro-Russia digital ecosystem
on Telegram
1
The Cyber, Milano
2
ITSTIME, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Intern
Zaznaczeni autorzy mieli równy wkład w przygotowanie tego artykułu
Data publikacji: 31-10-2023
Cybersecurity and Law 2023;10(2):299-317
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
STRESZCZENIE
The dissemination of pro-Russia ideologies and associated visual motifs has become
widespread and transversal, encompassing various communities within the digital
ecosystem. This trend has been linked to the related cognitive warfare that targets public
opinion, manipulates information, and undermines the credibility of democratic institutions.
Regarding the Italian context, the period from 2019 to 2023 saw a dramatic increase
in the number of actors promoting pro-Russia narratives. They included members of the novax
and no-greenpass movements, conspiracy theorists, far-right organizations, neo-Nazi
groups, and ultras. Concurrently, the digital ecosystem has contributed the spread of violent
content and anti-establishment propaganda online. In order to identify and explore the
Italian digital ecosystem affected by pro-Russia ideologies, this study exploits a combination
of exponential discriminative snowball sampling and social network analysis techniques
on the Telegram instant messaging service. Through this approach, this research provides
insight into the organizational structure and dynamics of the network, identifying key actors
and their relationships, and the dissemination patterns of pro-Russia and anti-establishment
propaganda. This study proposes a new research methodology to study digital ecosystems
permeated by cognitive warfare campaigns and provides a deeper understanding of the
mechanisms through which such content is propagated, enabling the development of effective
strategies for countering disinformation and promoting fact-based discourse.
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